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In this paper, we examine the old-age security hypothesis according to which parents
rear children because they expect the latter to care for them in their later years. In
developing countries where there are no perfect capital markets, children are usually
viewed as a potential source of income and as a time-related support in old age.
However, investing in children remains risky. By focusing on uncertainty about the
parental consumption during old age, we show that there exists a precautionary motive
for the demand for children so that fertility of prudent parents is expected to increase.
1. Introduction
In an economic environment such as poor developing countries where capital
markets are next to non-existent, two main strands of reproductive motivations
are usually used to analyse population growth (Dasgupta, 1993). In the first one,
children are viewed as durable consumer goods in the sense that they are desirable
in themselves and carry on the family lineage. In the second one, children are
considered as insurance goods in which case the reproductive motivation stems
from the old-age security that children can provide. Previously explored by
Leibenstein (1957), the old-age security hypothesis postulates that in a setting
where parents face uncertainty about their ability to support themselves during
old age, they rear children in the expectation of receiving assistance from their
children in their later years (Neher, 1971; Willis, 1980; Nerlove et al. 1987). The
underlying transfer mechanism is one of direct reciprocity, where parents give first
and children give later, without any intergenerational conflict: children are impli-
citly considered as passive agents under the control of parents, who honour the
contract loan by reimbursing their parents during their old-age.1
The old-age security hypothesis has been strongly supported by various empirical
studies in rural areas of developing countries, either in Africa or in Asia (Nugent,
1985). For example, in Malaysia, Raut (1996) shows that parents have longer birth
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1 As shown by Cremer and Pestieau (1991), the demand for children is strongly affected by the type of
child-parent interaction. For example, the strategic bequest solution induces the number of children to
be as large as possible to extract a greater amount of old-age support.
intervals when they have a sufficient stock of wealth to support themselves during
old-age. Likewise, he shows that the probability that respondents will rely on their
children when they are old is lower for couples with high income, with better access
to private pensions and other financial assets. Jensen (1990) finds evidence in
favour of the lexicographic safety-first model developed by Cain (1981), according
to which there exists a minimal number of children for hedging against future
disability risks when fertility decisions arise from old-age security. More surpris-
ingly, one observes that child benefits also have a positive and significant effect on
fertility rate in developed countries (Ermisch, 1988; Barmby and Cigno, 1990).
Using time series-data covering the post-war years, Cigno and Rosati (1992,
1996) show that both in Europe and in the United States, saving and fertility
would be jointly determined by self-interested parents. All of these results are
fully consistent with the old-age security hypothesis (see also Rendall and Bah-
chieva, 1998).
An important issue for policy implications concerns the role of financial capital
markets in influencing demand for children in developing countries. When parents
consider children as assets, the development of social security schemes or an
increase in the rate of returns of financial assets are expected to lower fertility,
thus partly explaining the demographic transition (Willis, 1982; Cigno, 1992). The
usual argument to explain this effect relies on an assumption of imperfect capital
markets.2 The idea that social security may act as a substitute for children is
empirically supported. In particular, Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) find a significant
decrease in fertility rate over time in a rural area of Mexico when farmers are given
access to a social security coverage and Entwisle and Winegarden (1984) show that
the demand for children is negatively related to the level of public pension pro-
grams. However, it has been suggested that incentives to having children are not
necessarily reduced with the development of financial credit markets (Nerlove et
al., 1987; Razin and Sadka, 1995). On the one hand, capital markets represent a
substitute form of investment for old-age support. On the other hand, capital
markets allow a greater amount of borrowing against future high returns in
order to finance the current costs of children in terms of education. In this frame-
work, a crucial but neglected issue concerns the level of risk associated to each form
of investment for old-age support, either buying financial assets or investing in
children.
The idea that children and financial markets are competing assets for support in
old-age has been extensively discussed by Cigno (1991; 1993) in a three-period
overlapping generations model without altruism and also by Bergstrom (1996) in
the context of the demonstration effect theory of transfers, in which adults take care
of their parents in order to elicit symmetric future behaviour from their children.
In this setting, the demand for children is exogenous and adults who exhibit a high
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2 Nevertheless, as shown by Wildasin (1990), the capital market imperfections are not necessary for this
result provided that the social security program is underfunded.
degree of risk aversion prefer to invest in less risky assets by saving in the financial
market rather than relying on the familial network.3 As one considers models of
intergenerational redistribution with endogenous fertility, the demand for children
for old-age support has been linked to the existence of the uncertainty related to
expected transfers by Appelbaum and Katz (1991) and Rosati (1996). The family
reacts to this uncertainty by spreading risk across children. By assuming that
children are not necessarily able to repay the support they received earlier in
their life course, Rosati (1996) shows that in a non-altruistic setting, a reduction
of uncertainty exerts an ambiguous effect on the number of children; when parents
are sufficiently risk adverse, social security is expected to decrease fertility.
The purpose of our paper is to explore the consequences of uncertainty about
parental old-age consumption on the demand for children when financial capital
markets do not exist. Using a dynamic model where parents consider children as
assets, we show that the fertility rate is strongly affected in an uncertain environ-
ment. Our concerns are close to the ideas developed in Appelbaum and Katz (1991)
and Rosati (1996). Indeed, these studies have shown that a change in the variance
of the random shock does influence the fertility decisions. However, the purpose of
our contribution is not to study the factors determining the magnitude of the
effects of risk, but to examine how parents are expected to respond to the risk
by making adjustments that help to reduce the expected cost of the risk. Thus, we
prove that changes in fertility behaviour are not explained by the concept of risk
aversion, but that they are related to the measure of parental prudence (Kimball,
1990, 1992).4 To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies dealing
with the role of prudence in models of fertility decisions. Our main result is that the
more prudent are parents, the stronger the precautionary motive for having
children.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a
two-period model for old-age support, which allows us to derive the demand for
children under certainty. In Section 3, we make the assumption that parental
consumption in old age is a random variable and we derive the necessary condition
for an interior maximum. In Section 4, we compare the two levels of fertility and
we provide formal proof that the demand for children under uncertainty depends
on the prudence of parents. Concluding remarks are found in Section 5.
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3 In order to secure for old-age support, parents may either save in the financial market with a sure
return of saving or engage in risky demonstration-effect transfers whose rate of return depends on the
probability to be imitated by children in the future ( Jellal and Wolff, 2000). The level of upstream
transfers made by adults is an increasing function of the rate of return of the demonstration effect.
4 Both in Appelbaum and Katz (1991) and Rosati (1996), any demand for children is solely based on
parental risk aversion. In our model, a change in the riskiness affects fertility behaviour when parents are
prudent in the presence of risk. As detailed in Kimball (1990; 1992), the decision of how to avoid a risk is
governed by risk aversion, while prudence concerns the decision of how to prepare in the face of
uncertainty.
2. A model of old-age support
For the presentation, we consider a household composed of parents and children
that maximizes utility over two periods, subject to budget constraints operating in
each period. In the model, ties between family members do not result from altruis-
tic feelings and transfers are part of an intertemporal exchange between the gen-
erations.5 Concerning fertility decisions, we assume that parents are able to control
their own fertility without any cost, as family planning programs are promoted by
governments in many developing countries. The timing of the model is as follow:
parents first choose the number of children and they invest in their children’s
human capital a fixed amount of resources; then they are paid back, through
money and services, during their later years, so that intergenerational transfers
between family members are like a portfolio-choice operation.
We consider the case where there is no financial capital market, as it may be
found in rural areas of developing countries. Indeed, our study deals with the
consequences of the existence of uncertainty on the demand for children and
not with the effects of a social security program on fertility (see Rosati, 1996).
Therefore, children are the only means of consumption smoothing. In fact, this
hypothesis of imperfect capital markets is not as restrictive as it may seen and the
model could be easily extended to the case of developed countries. An alternative
interpretation concerns the form of the reimbursement made by children for old-
age support. One can imagine that parents expect services and attention from their
children that have no close market substitutes, rather than cash gifts.6 In this
setting, parents would be compelled to invest in their progeny if they wanted to
receive attention and affection in return in old age (Ehrlich and Lui, 1991).
Following Nerlove et al. (1987), we make the assumption that parents are purely
selfish, in the sense that they derive satisfaction from their own lifetime income
stream only. Hence, parents seek to maximize the utility function UðC1;C2Þ, where
C1 and C2 are the levels of parental consumption respectively in the first and
second period of their life. We suppose that U is a three-time continuously differ-
entiable, quasi-concave utility function. Let Ui be the partial derivative of
UðC1;C2Þ with respect to the i argument in U , so that we have U1 > 0, U2 > 0,
and U11 < 0, U22 < 0. Besides, for the second-order condition, we suppose that the
condition U11U22  U212 > 0 is satisfied.
In the first period, parents earn an exogenous income Y1. Let h be the fixed
amount of child-rearing costs, which includes both the monetary cost of schooling
and the basic subsistence costs such as expenditures on food and medicine. The
number of children chosen by parents is denoted by n, so that an amount of
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5 By focusing on the recent economic explanations of changes in fertility behaviour, Cigno (1992) points
out the main role of incentives connected with motives for private transfer income within the family.
6 There exist two main types of child services: participation in home-production; and care-giving
activities, contact, and visits. While parents can do without material transfers from the children by
saving in the presence of a perfect capital market, there is no market alternative to contact and affection.
financial resources hn is devoted to investments in the young generation. In the
second period, we suppose that parents also get a personal but smaller income Y2,
which is used to finance part of their old-age consumption. Even if this assumption
is not necessary for the model, we think that in developing countries it is more
realistic to consider that elderly parents still participate in agricultural production
because of farm-specific experience. For example, one can consider that parents
who were previously land-owning peasants may get personal resources by selling
part of a self-produced agricultural crop or by leasing out some of their land.
Another possible source of income consists in upstream intergenerational trans-
fers. Indeed, parents rely on the support of their n children, who have to reimburse
the parental investments received during their schooling. For simplicity, we make
the assumption that each child within the family provides the same amount of
repayment for the loan made one period earlier. Let t be the fixed amount of
transfer that each child pays back to his parents. A justification for this assumption
is found in the existence of family rules yielding a Pareto-efficient consumption
over the life cycle of each generation. In a three-generational framework, Cigno
(1991, 1993) proves the existence of a self-enforcing family constitution where all
family members are interested in going on with the amounts of transfers prescribed
by the family rule.7 The repayment of the debt depends on the total number of
children and tn denotes the sum of the personal child contributions. Formally, the
budget constraints for the parents in the two periods are
C1 ¼ Y1  hn ð1Þ
C2 ¼ Y2 þ tn ð2Þ
In this section, we are interested in the standard case where the second-period
consumption of parents is known with certainty. Implicitly, the meaning of this
assumption is that one expects each child to honour his commitments and to repay
the parental loans. Why will children not default on the repayment? In Cigno
(1993), the family constitution prescribes at each date the amounts of intergenera-
tional transfers. If a child does not transfer money to his parents, his own children
will be exempted from transferring upstream resources in the next period. The
family constitution is self-fulfilling under certain conditions. In this mutuality
model, all generations are interested in going on with the chain. The set of strate-
gies such that any generations will comply with the family rules if and only if
parents repaid their own debt is a Nash-equilibrium.8
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7 Rather than having fixed gifts, Rosati (1996) considers the case where the intra-family interest rate of
loans is fixed by the family constitution.
8 Other mechanisms relying on self-interested explanations may guarantee the effectiveness of such an
intertemporal exchange (see Laferre`re, 1999). According to Becker (1993), parents who are worried
about old-age support attempt to inculcate in their children a feeling of culpability and guilt if the
latter do not comply with the desired behaviour. Cox and Stark (1996) and Jellal and Wolff (2000) argue
in favour of a demonstration effect, which induces parents to shape the children’s preferences by setting
an example. Parents care for their elders as they would like to be treated themselves later by their
progeny.
Substituting the two budget constraints into UðC1;C2Þ, parents choose the
number of children n to maximize
max
n
UðY1  hn;Y2 þ tnÞ ð3Þ
We can now determine the optimal demand for children under certainty, denoted
by n*. According to the first-order necessary condition for an interior maximum
hU1ðC*1;C*2Þ þ tU2ðC*1;C*2Þ ¼ 0 ð4Þ
the marginal cost of raising children in terms of a decrease in first-period con-
sumption and the marginal benefit from assistance receipt in old-age are equalized
at the optimum. From (4), we get the usual arbitrage condition U1=U2 ¼ t=h for
shifting consumption between the first and second periods.
3. Uncertainty about the old-age consumption
Following Rosati (1996), we now relax the prevalent assumption that the old-age
level of consumption C2 is known with certainty.
9 We consider the case where the
second-period consumption is a random variable denoted by ~C2 such that
~C2 ¼ Y2 þ tn þ " ð5Þ
In this setting, we assume that the variable " is an additive random term defined
on the state space  and characterized by the distribution function Fð"Þ. We make
the additional hypothesis that Eð"Þ ¼ 0 and Vð"Þ ¼ 2 > 0.
Given the old-age resource constraint ~C2 ¼ Y2 þ tn þ ", the introduction of
uncertainty in our model may be interpreted in two different ways. On the one
hand, one can consider that parents receive an uncertain income because of the
presence of risk in an agrarian environment, for example owing to uncertainties in
agricultural yields and the prices of inputs and outputs ( ~Y2 ¼ Y2 þ "). On the other
hand, investing in children is a risky operation since children may be unable to
repay their parents in old age and ~tn ¼ tn þ ". The riskiness of familial loans is a
central problem for agrarian communities where there exist a variety of individual-
specific risks such as illness, infection or fire damage and agricultural risks with
production failure and poor harvest. The risk of a repayment default from children
has two possible explanations (see Rosati, 1996): it may arise either from the
uncertainty of the survival probability of the children or from the uncertainty of
their level of income when children are old enough to honour their debt. With low
agricultural yields due to poor climatic conditions, adult children may not get
enough resources to repay their debt. It seems useful to note that these two
previous factors are also operating in developed countries. The probability that
children reach adulthood remains necessarily lower than one and children are often
subject to labour risk such as unemployment.
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9 Using a three-generational non-altruistic model of transfers, Rosati (1996) accounts for the existence of
uncertainty relative to the survival of children from youth to middle-age.
Formally, given the existence of uncertainty about the second-period consump-





UðY1  hn;Y2 þ tn þ "Þ dFð"Þ ð6Þ
The first-order necessary condition for an interior maximum is henceð

½hU1ð ~C1; ~C2Þ þ tU2ð ~C1; ~C2Þ dFð"Þ ¼ 0 ð7Þ
where the budget constraints ~C1 ¼ Y1  h~n and ~C2 ¼ Y2 þ t~n þ ", and ~n indicates
the demand for children under uncertainty. In this framework, we wonder whether
the randomness of the parental old-age consumption increases or decreases the
optimal rate of fertility in developing countries.
4. The demand for children under uncertainty
To compare the optimal values for n* and ~n, we define the following function ð"Þ
given the first-order condition (7)
ð"Þ ¼ hU1ð ~C1; ~C2Þ þ tU2ð ~C1; ~C2Þ
Hence, we can write the demand for children under uncertainty in the following
way ð

ð"Þ n¼~nj dFð"Þ ¼ 0
so that a necessary and sufficient condition to examine the incidence of uncertainty
on the fertility rate is to study the sign of the integral
Ð
 ð"Þ n¼n	j dFð"Þ. The main
result of our paper is summarized in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 The demand for children under uncertainty is such that
n* > ð<Þ~n , hU122ðC*1;C*2Þ þ tU222ðC*1;C*2Þ < ð>Þ0
Proof From the definition of ~n such that
Ð
 ð"Þ n¼~nj dFð"Þ ¼ 0, we arrive at the
result that n* is greater (respectively lower) than ~n if the term
Ð
 ð"Þ n¼n	j dFð"Þ is
negative (respectively positive). From the definition of , the demand for children
n* when there is no risk of non-repayment satisfies the condition
ðEð"ÞÞ ¼ hU1ðC*1;C*2Þ þ tU2ðC*1;C*2Þ
Hence, from Jensen’s inequality, we deduce that n* > ~n if and only if the con-
dition
Ð
 ð"Þ n¼n	j dFð"Þ < ðEð"ÞÞ is satisfied (the converse holds for ~n > n*), so
that the comparison between the values of n* and ~n depends on the convexity of the
function ð"Þ.
The demand for children under uncertainty is lower than n* if ð"Þ is a concave
function of ", a condition which is satisfied for  0ð"Þ ¼ hU12 þ tU22 > 0 and
 00ð"Þ ¼ hU122 þ tU222 < 0. Conversely, the inequality n* < ~n holds when ð"Þ
is a convex function of ", which requires the condition  00ð"Þ > 0. &
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In this very simple framework, one can see that the concept of risk aversion
remains insufficient to explain the changes in fertility behaviour induced by the
uncertain old-age consumption. In rural areas of developing countries where a
great deal of individual and environmental risks are found among agricultural
communities, our theoretical results reveal the presence of a precautionary
motive for having children, whose strength is measured through the concept of
absolute prudence introduced by Kimball (1990) and expressed by
PðwÞ ¼ UFðwÞ=U 00ðwÞ for any initial wealth w. As one considers that households
are characterized by non-separable preferences E½UðC1; ~C2Þ with Ui > 0 and
Uii < 0, the measure of absolute prudence in the context of our problem is defined
by
PðwÞ ¼ hU122 þ tU222
hU12  tU22
where the denominator hU12  tU22 is positive since the first-period consumption
C1 is a normal good (Dre`ze and Modigliani, 1972; Kimball, 1990). In our setting,
the sign of the measure of absolute prudence is just given by the sign of the
numerator hU122 þ tU222, which brings the two following additional results.
Corollary 1 Given the uncertainty about old-age consumption, prudent households
are expected to face an increase in fertility rate.
Indeed, we have shown that the inequality ~n > n* holds if hU122 þ tU222 > 0.
Provided that sgnðhU122 þ tU222Þ ¼ sgnP and that a positive value of P corre-
sponds to a prudent behaviour, Corollary 1 indicates that prudence gives rise to a
precautionary motive for having children in an uncertain environment. This means
that the prospect of the random old-age consumption will increase the demand for
children relative to the situation where the level of income received by the young
generation is high enough to repay the debt owed to parents.
Corollary 2 When preferences are separable, the comparison between n* and ~n
depends on the sign of U222.
Under the assumption of separability, we know that the utility function of
parents is defined by E½UðC1; ~C2Þ ¼ UðC1Þ þ E½Uð ~C2Þ, so that we get
hU122 þ tU222 ¼ tU222 since U12 ¼ 0. In that case, the measure of absolute pru-
dence that gives the strength of the precautionary motive for having children is
simply P ¼ U222=U22; as the second-order derivative U22 is negative, we get
sgn P ¼ sgn U222.10
So, prudent parents are expected to hedge against an increased risk of con-
sumption in old age by having more children. From an empirical perspective, it
mohamed jellal and franc ois-charles wolff 643
..........................................................................................................................................................................
10 If we consider the case of an isoelastic utility function U , as usual in studies exploring consumption
behaviour in connection with fertility choice, it is easy to see that the first-derivative U2 is a strictly
convex function and hence U222 > 0.
seems useful to identify variables that are likely to influence the prudence of the
households. However, there are few empirical studies dealing with the impact of
individual characteristics on the degree of prudence. For our purpose, we discuss
selected empirical evidence on the precautionary saving motive. Several recent
attempts test whether the precautionary motive is an important force in consumer
behaviour, with conflicting results (for a survey, see Browning and Lusardi, 1996).
Individual choices are quite heterogeneous.11
A main difficulty for the problem is to have an accurate measure of risk faced by
households, which may be given by variability in income, consumption variability,
or subjective expectations about future income. Empirical findings suggest that
prudence is mainly linked to occupation, income, and age of the household. In
Skinner (1988), income uncertainty is proxied by occupation, but there may exist a
self-selection of less risk-averse people into riskier occupations. Nevertheless, using
panel data, Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998) and Kazarosian (1997) find greater
prudence for both the self-employed and farmers.12 Conversely, workers in the
public sector are expected to have a lower precautionary motive. Households
that currently experience unemployment should be more prudent, as they are
more likely to be unemployed in the future. In that case, transmission of social
status also increases the probability that children become unemployed, leading to a
greater uncertainty for the parental consumption in old age. The effect of education
on prudence is not clear, since educational attainment may be correlated with the
household’s time preference rate (Dynan, 1993).
Gourinchas and Parker (2001) show that a precautionary motive is more likely at
low wealth levels, meaning that parental prudence is greater for households with
poor income and low wealth. Besides, households with more than one income
earner are expected to face less income risk; risk pooling is likely among multiple
earners. The precautionary term is also especially important at young age. Age is
undoubtedly correlated with uncertainty, but it is also an individual taste shifter,
especially as one examines fertility decisions. In fact, these joint factors should be
associated to a greater prudence. Labour-income uncertainty is more important for
young households, who are characterized by a low level of wealth. Finally, people
with poor health are expected to be more prudent, since they have more uncertain
health expenditures (especially in old age).13
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11 Studying the role of a precautionary motive requires the identification of some observable and
exogenous source of risk that varies across the population.
12 Since farmers are generally born into the profession rather than having chosen it, the self-selection
argument is unlikely to apply (Kazarosian, 1997).
13 Recent empirical studies have shown that the precautionary motive has some role to play in explaining
saving behaviour. However, an underlying assumption is that family size is exogenous. Since having
children is a form of investment, then the decision to have children affects the precautionary saving. The
effect of greater uncertainty should be examined by accounting for both saving and fertility choices.
5. Concluding comments
In this paper, we have analysed the effect of uncertainty on fertility in a setting
where family support is the only way of transferring resources between the gen-
erations. In many countries, numerous explanations make it necessary to account
for uncertainty on the parental consumption in old age. In particular, children may
be unable to repay their debt because mortality prevents them from reaching their
productive period or because they do not succeed in acquiring a sufficient level of
income. This randomness of the level of resources in old-age is obviously greater in
developing countries within an agrarian environment, but the risk of default also
exists in developed countries since parents have to rely on the support of their
children if they are interested in receiving attention and affection that have no close
market substitutes.
Hence, our paper highlights an aspect of the old-age security hypothesis that has
been extensively discussed in the subsequent literature related to intergenerational
transfers, namely that parents are not necessarily able to enforce children to give
them some transfer when the latter are in their productive period; curiously, this
problem has received little theoretical attention. Using a two-period model, the
most important finding of our paper is that there may exist a precautionary motive
for having children under uncertainty. The derivation of the conditions under
which this result holds reveals that the fertility rate of prudent parents is expected
to increase. Thus, the high levels of fertility that one still observes in agrarian
communities may be interpreted as the response that prudent parents give rise
to the risk that only some of their children would provide them resources in old-
age. For example, from a longitudinal viewpoint, the study of Boongaarts and Cain
(1981) exhibits a substantial replacement rate through increased fertility following
the Bangladesh famine of 1974 (see also Cain, 1983).
A final comment deals with the policy issues raised by our model. When parents
make child investments in exchange for the care they expect their children to
provide for them in old age, an appropriate policy to reduce high fertility levels
is to provide parents some alternatives to their own children as the only source of
old-age support. The introduction of state insurance schemes for upstream trans-
fers and health care lessens the incentives to perform these functions within the
family. However, in spite of the effectiveness of public programs on women’s
schooling, child health, and family planning methods, these forms of social welfare
legislation are often not a realistic option to decrease the demand for children in
low-income developing countries because of their excessive costs compared to the
available public funds. According to our theoretical results, a policy designed to
decrease the level of environmental risk among agrarian communities may also be
an effective way to reduce fertility. Public resources devoted to the pooling of
agricultural risks, for example by improving food transportation and food
exchanges across different regions, should contribute significantly to the decline
in fertility in developing countries by lessening the precautionary motive for having
children.
mohamed jellal and franc ois-charles wolff 645
Acknowledgements
We are indebted to the anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
References
Appelbaum, E. and Katz, E. (1991). ‘The demand for children in the absence of capital and
risk markets : a portfolio approach’, Oxford Economic Papers, 43, 292–304.
Barmby, T. and Cigno, A. (1990). ‘A sequential probability model of fertility patterns’,
Journal of Population Economics, 3, 31–51.
Becker, G.S. (1993). ‘Nobel lecture : the economic way of looking at behavior’, Journal of
Political Economy, 101, 385–409.
Bergstrom, T.C. (1996). ‘Economics in a family way’, Journal of Economic Literature, 34,
1903–34.
Boongaarts, J. and Cain, M. (1981). Demographic Responses to Famine, Population Council,
New York.
Browning, M. and Lusardi, A. (1996). ‘Household saving: micro theories and micro facts’,
Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 1797–1855.
Cain, M. (1981). ‘Risk and insurance: perspectives on fertility and agrarian change in India
and Bangladesh’, Population and Development Review, 7, 435–74.
Cain, M. (1983). ‘Fertility as an adjustment to risk’, Population and Development Review, 9,
688–702.
Carroll, C.D. and Samwick, A.A. (1997). ‘The nature of precautionary wealth’, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 40, 41–72.
Carroll, C.D. and Samwick, A.A. (1998). ‘How important is precautionary saving ?’, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 80, 410–19.
Cigno, A. (1991). Economics of the Family, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cigno, A. (1992). ‘Children and pensions’, Journal of Population Economics, 5, 175–83.
Cigno, A. (1993). ‘Intergenerational transfers without altruism : family, market and state’,
European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 505–18.
Cigno, A. and Rosati, F.C. (1992). ‘The effects of financial markets and social security on
saving and fertility behaviour in Italy’, Journal of Population Economics, 5, 319–41.
Cigno, A. and Rosati, F.C. (1996). ‘Jointly Determined Saving and Fertility Behaviour:
Theory, and Estimates for Germany, Italy, UK and USA’, European Economic Review, 40,
1561–89.
Cox, D. and Stark, O. (1996). ‘Intergenerational transfers and the demonstration effect’,
Discussion Paper, Boston College.
Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P. (1991). ‘Bequests, filial attention and fertility’, Economica, 58,
359–75.
Dasgupta, P. (1993). An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Dynan, K.E. (1993). ‘How prudent are consumers?’, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 1104–
13.
646 insecure old-age security
Dre`ze, J. and Modigliani, F. (1972). ‘Consumption decisions under uncertainty’, Journal of
Economic Theory, 5, 308–35.
Ehrlich, I. and Lui, F.T. (1991). ‘Intergenerational trade, longevity and economic growth’,
Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1029–59.
Entwisle, B. and Winegarden, C.R. (1984). ‘Fertility and pension programs in LDCs: a model
of mutual reinforcement’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 32, 331–54.
Ermisch, J. (1988). ‘Econometric analysis of birth rate dynamics’, Journal of Human
Resources, 23, 563–75.
Gourinchas, P.O. and Parker, J.A. (2001). ‘The empirical importance of precautionary
saving’, American Economic Review, 91, 406–12.
Jellal, M. and Wolff, F.C. (2000). ‘Shaping intergenerational relationships : the demonstra-
tion effect’, Economics Letters, 68, 255–61.
Jensen, E.R. (1990). ‘An econometric analysis of the old-age security motive for childbear-
ing’, International Economic Review, 31, 953–68.
Kazarosian, M. (1997). ‘Precautionary savings. a panel study’, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 79, 241–47.
Kimball, M.S. (1990). ‘Precautionary saving in the small and in the large’, Econometrica, 58,
53–73.
Kimball, M.S. (1992). ‘Precautionary motives for holding assets’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate,
and P. Newman (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Norton, New
York.
Laferre`re, A. (1999). ‘Intergenerational transmission models: a survey’, Geneva Papers on
Risk and Insurance, 24, 2–26.
Leibenstein, H. (1957). Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, Wiley, New York.
Neher, P.A. (1971). ‘Peasants, procreation and pensions’, American Economic Review, 61,
380–89.
Nerlove, M., Razin, A. and Sadka, E. (1987) Household and Economy. Welfare Economics and
Endogenous Fertility, Academic Press, Boston.
Nugent, J.B. (1985). ‘The old-age security motive for fertility’, Population and Development
Review, 11, 75–98.
Nugent, J.B. and Gillaspy, R.T. (1983). ‘Old-age pensions and fertility in rural areas of less
developed countries: some evidence from Mexico’, Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 31, 809–30.
Raut, L.K. (1996). ‘Old-age security and gender preference hypotheses: a duration analysis of
Malaysian family life survey data’, Journal of Quantitative Economics, 12, 81–104.
Razin, A. and Sadka, E. (1995). Population Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Rendall, M.S. and Bahchieva, R.A. (1998). ‘An old-age security motive for fertility in the
United States?’, Population and Development Review, 24, 293–307.
Rosati, F.C. (1996). ‘Social security in a non-altruistic model with uncertainty and endo-
genous fertility’, Journal of Public Economics, 60, 283–94.
Skinner, J. (1988). ‘Risky income, life cycle consumption and precautionary savings’, Journal
of Monetary Economics, 22, 237–55.
Wildasin, D.E. (1990). ‘Non-neutrality of debt with endogenous fertility’, Oxford Economic
Papers, 42, 414–28.
mohamed jellal and franc ois-charles wolff 647
Willis, R.J. (1980). ‘The old age security hypothesis and population growth’, in T. Burch
(ed.), Demographic Behavior: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Decision Making, Westview
Press, Boulder, CO.
Willis, R.J. (1982). ‘The direction of intergenerational transfers and demographic transition:
the Caldwell Hypothesis reexamined’, Population and Development Review, 8, 207–34.
648 insecure old-age security

